Mises and the problem of induction

pp. 7-33

in: Alexander Linsbichler, Was Ludwig von Mises a conventionalist?, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017

Abstract

A rational reconstruction of Mises' problem situation reveals that his primary epistemological concern is the problem of induction. Applying a regressive method, three major tenets of his philosophy of science and their implications can be identified: (1) Anti-naturalism, i.e., the postulate that there is no induction in the social universe, renders the efforts of the Historical School spurious. (2) Mises opines that his dualism concerning the psycho-physical problem, the purely methodological character of which is often overlooked, is incompatible with materialistic and physicalistic research in the social sciences. This involves a rejection of behaviorism. (3) Finally, all holistic, essentialist, and even many macroeconomic approaches contradict Mises' individualism and are thus rejected. Further traits of Mises' philosophy of science include realism, Wertfreiheit (value freedom), and a rejection of polylogism.