Cognitive autonomy and epistemology of action in Hayek's and Merleau-Ponty's thought
pp. 149-176
in: Roger Frantz, Robert Leeson (eds), Hayek and behavioral economics, Berlin, Springer, 2013Abstract
As is well known, the “chief interest behind Merleau-Ponty’s thought … was the phenomenology that emerged in Germany in the early decades of the twenty century” (Carman & Hansen 2005, p. 5). Founded by Edmund Husserl, phenomenology is a philosophical approach focusing on the nature of consciousness and notably on its intuitive and interpretative presuppositions. As Madison (1994, p. 38 ff.) remarks, in spite of the fact that Hayek cannot be considered a direct follower of Husserl, he shares, along with others members of the Austrian school, phenomenology’s dislike for scientistic objectivism. This point has been underlined by Udhen as well (2001, pp. 63, 140). Moreover, according to Udhen (pp. 114, 124), Hayek’s methodological individualism was significantly influenced by the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz, a follower of both Mises and Husserl (see also Cubeddu 1997; Smith 1996).
