How enactive is the dynamic sensorimotor account of raw feel?
discussing some insights from phenomenology and the cognitive sciences
pp. 67-81
in: Andrew O. Martin (ed), Contemporary sensorimotor theory, Berlin, Springer, 2014Abstract
This contribution deals with the question of how enactive O'Regan's dynamic sensorimotor account of phenomenal consciousness is. It answers this question by focusing on O'Regan's dynamic sensorimotor account of raw feel. It supports the view that O'Regan's sensorimotor approach is semi-enactive because it clings to environment-centric ecological Gibsonian overtones. It emphasizes the instrumental role of action in perception enactivism rejects and neglects the subjectivity of experience. This contribution makes the point that the role of the motor and cognitive-emotional aroused lived body and the subject's conscious access to it in experiencing the qualities of sensorimotor interactions and hence the subjectivity of experience need to be taken into account in order to overcome the ecological environment-centric overtones of O'Regan's approach.