Representation, analytic pragmatism and AI

Raffaela Giovagnoli

pp. 161-169

in: Gordana Dodig Crnkovic, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic, Raffaela Giovagnoli (eds), Computing nature, Berlin, Springer, 2013

Abstract

Our contribution aims at individuating a valid philosophical strategy for a fruitful confrontation between human and artificial representation. The ground for this theoretical option resides in the necessity to find a solution that overcomes, on the one side, strong AI (i.e. Haugeland) and, on the other side, the view that rules out AI as explanation of human capacities (i.e. Dreyfus). We try to argue for Analytic Pragmatism (AP) as a valid strategy to present arguments for a form of weak AI and to explain a notion of representation common to human and artificial agents.