A note on transcendental propositions in Kant's critique of pure reason

Konrad Cramer

pp. 37-43

in: Peter Bieri, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Lorenz Krüger (eds), Transcendental arguments and science, Berlin, Springer, 1979

Abstract

Right in the opening section of his paper on "Transcendental Proofs in the Critique of Pure Reason"¹ Baum displays discontent with those interpreters who suppose that instead of asking: How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?, Kant is really asking: What are the necessary conditions of a possible experience?² Baum is of the opinion that strategies which reduce Kant's question to that form cannot give a satisfying account of the sort of theory the Critique of Pure Reason has to offer.

Cited authors

Kant Immanuel