Lakatos' mitigated scepticism in the philosophy of mathematics

Teun Koetsier

pp. 189-210

in: George Kampis, Ladislav Kvasz, Michael Stöltzner (eds), Appraising Lakatos, Berlin, Springer, 2002

Abstract

Lakatos liked to view his work in the philosophy of mathematics against the background of the traditional epistemological battle between dogmatists and sceptics. Dogmatists are those who hold A) that we can attain truth and B) that we can know that we have attained truth. Sceptics are those who hold A) that we cannot attain truth, or at least B) that we cannot know that we have attained truth. Lakatos himself represented a form of mitigated scepticism (often called critical fallibilism). Like the sceptics, he held A) that we cannot attain truth, or at least B) that we cannot know that we have attained truth, but he held in addition — and in this respect he distinguished himself from extreme sceptics — C) that we can improve our knowledge and know that we have improved it.

Cited authors

Lakatos Imre