Philosophical reflections in the nineteenth century medicolegal discussion

Corinna Delkeskamp

pp. 15-38

in: Tristram Engelhardt, Stuart Spicker (eds), Mental health: philosophical perspectives, Berlin, Springer, 1978

Abstract

A Symposium on Medicine and Philosophy is a priori a suspicious enterprise. Even though certain problems in the medical field have been diagnosed as beyond the narrow limits of the discipline (strictly understood), philosophers ought to weigh prudently those cuckoo's eggs before adopting them as their own. Interest in medicine is no excuse for philosophizing about it; nor should the recent graciousness of our medical friends in asking for our opinions induce us to imagine that it is our business. Indeed, the 19th century medicolegal discussion of insanity provides ample illustration of a healthy hostility — wholeheartedly agreed upon by both the medical and legal factions — against metaphysical quibblers meddling with an affair which they rightly felt they could settle for themselves.¹ This resentment was matched by a remarkable lack of interest on the part of academic philosophers.