Psychology and philosophy of science

C. Sanders

H. V. Rappard

pp. 219-267

in: Leendert Mos (ed), Annals of theoretical psychology, Berlin, Springer, 1985

Abstract

In this paper the authors take a functionalist epistemological starting point. A fundamental idea is the concept of the structuring of reality as it takes place in science. The scientific community gives prospective scientists a dual training: a perceptual training which makes them see reality (the object of science) in a special way (structuring) designed to make it invariant, and a methodological training which makes them formulate knowledge in a way that is acceptable to the scientific community.From this point of view we deal with the role that human values play in science, the difference between the various kinds of science, and the special character of psychology as science. Finally, from within this framework we also address differences between the formal structures of scientific languages.In conclusion, we consider some methodological consequences for psychology, the suitability of the hypothetical-deductive method in psychology, and the possibility of other forms of verification in psychology. We reject both the "received view" and the idealistic conception of the incommensurability of theories.