Self, agent, soul

Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī's critical reception of avicennian psychology

Jari Kaukua

pp. 75-89

in: Jari Kaukua, Tomáš Ekenberg (eds), Subjectivity and selfhood in medieval and early modern philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 2016

Abstrakt

This paper investigates Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī's critical reception and development of an Avicennian argument that hinges on the intuitive evidence provided by our awareness of ourselves. According to the argument, each of us is indubitably aware of enduring as a single subject and agent behind the constantly varying stream of experience and action. On the basis of this intuitive certainty Avicenna concludes that the human soul is similarly one. By introducing problematic acts related to the Peripatetic concept of soul, such as digestion and growth, Abū al-Barakāt suggests that if we want to save the argumentative power of the relevant phenomena, we must revise the Avicennian concept of self-awareness.