Affective aversion, ethics, and fiction
pp. 207-234
in: Thomas Blake (ed), The Palgrave handbook of affect studies and textual criticism, Berlin, Springer, 2017Abstract
Our ethical systems, while variable, are by no means arbitrary, for our conceptions of morality remain always tethered by and to specific ways that human bodies interact with historical, cultural, and material reality. Even so, the bulk of Western philosophy mistrusts sensory perception, remains suspicious of emotional experience, and separates moral development from our embodied reality. Current research in neuroscience and evolutionary psychology, however, stresses that affective states and the neurobiology underlying them play an essential role in ethical development and moral action. As a "moral emotion," disgust protects against (perceived) threats to community cohesion thus compels us to privilege familiarity, reject otherness, and pursue categorical certainty. This suggests we are burdened by an embodied "affective aversion" to difference that profoundly influences our moral reasoning. At the same time, however, studies reveal we also possess a physiological resistance to observing others in physical or emotional pain, and this "affective aversion" to human suffering makes empathy possible and serves as the counterforce to disgust-based ethics. Evidence is growing that our cognitive flexibility ensures that a faculty like empathy is plastic, so affective attunement and "fellow feeling" can be developed throughout life. Furthermore, fiction, as a means of understanding other people's intentions, goals, and desires to flourish, can help provide us with "a common point of view" that promotes collective well-being without demanding moral absolutism.