Perception, justification and transcendental philosophy
pp. 112-131
in: Sjoerd van Tuinen, Niamh Mcdonnell (eds), Deleuze and the fold, Berlin, Springer, 2010Abstrakt
The discussion of the nature of transcendental philosophy has a long and intricate history. The reception of and response to Kant has a prominent role in this history, not least because the conception of "transcendental philosophy' while not perhaps conceptually originating with Kant, certainly has a nominal origin with him.1 In relation to the reception of Kant, while a number of distinct problems have received differential priority at various times, the question of the structure of the transcendental deduction and the nature of "transcendental arguments' have received in recent years particular attention.2 While the epigraph above from The Fold does not refer to transcendental deduction in particular in its contrast of a Leibnizian transcendental philosophy to a Kantian one, it is in relation to this that I will be presenting my response to its overall argument for the view that Leibniz is a transcendental philosopher.
