The Tractatus theory of objects

Eddy M. Zemach

pp. 35-50

in: Rudolf Haller, Johannes L. Brandl (eds), Wittgenstein — eine neubewertung/Wittgenstein — towards a re-evaluation, Berlin, Springer, 1990

Abstrakt

In this article I offer a new interpretation of the Tractatus' theory of Objects¹. I maintain, first, that in the Tractatus there is a detailed model of the Objects; second, that that model plays a crucial role in the Tractatus, including its logic; third, that the said model is free of contradiction. Each one of these claims, and especially the third, may sound surprising. There is a general agreement among Wittgenstein scholars that the theory of Objects in the Tractatus has been a failure. Wittgenstein himself has later said so, so perhaps we too may dismiss it off hand. Furthermore, Wittgenstein thought that the argument for the existence of simples does not depend on what these simples are²; so some writers (e.g., Hacker³, Winch⁴) concluded that one need not know what the Objects are to understand the Tractatus. Others (Ishiguro⁵, McGuinness⁶) hold that Objects are values of dummy names or bound variables in fully analyzed propositions, so it does not matter what they may be⁷. I maintain the opposite view: to understand the Tractatus one must know what is an Object's (1) content; (2) form (internal properties); and (3) external properties. One must also understand how the Tractatus' answers the hardest objection (the problem of color incompatibility) to that model.

Cited authors

Wittgenstein Ludwig