Searching for the lost subject

pp. 157-185

in: Alexei Chernyakov, The ontology of time, Berlin, Springer, 2002

Abstrakt

We have already seen that in Aristotle's description of the mechanism of the "soul" the metaphor of place, expressed or implied, plays a major role. The soul is a kind of a map of abilities or powers (δυνáμεlς), and these powers in action form the system of energeiai having various internal forms. The unity of the soul so described is a topological, structural unity. Strictly speaking the soul itself is the principle of unity, since it is "the form (εlδoς) of a natural body, which potentially has life" (De anima II 1, 412a20f. ). The soul is the internal form or the essence (oυσlα) of a living body as such it comprises and unites all manifestations or ener;eiai of life (for the soul itself is the first entelechy of a living body (412a27), including, if we mean man, the energeia of intelligence (υόησlς) and the energeia of circumspection (φρόυησlς), i. e., the energeia of good deeds.