
Publication details
Year: 1990
Pages: 77-96
Series: Synthese
Full citation:
, "Physics and common causes", Synthese 82 (1), 1990, pp. 77-96.
Abstract
The common cause principle states that common causes produce correlations amongst their effects, but that common effects do not produce correlations amongst their causes. I claim that this principle, as explicated in terms of probabilistic relations, is false in classical statistical mechanics. Indeterminism in the form of stationary Markov processes rather than quantum mechanics is found to be a possible saviour of the principle. In addition I argue that if causation is to be explicated in terms of probabilities, then it should be done in terms of probabilistic relations which are invariant under changes of initial distributions. Such relations can also give rise to an asymmetric cause-effect relationship which always runs forwards in time.
Publication details
Year: 1990
Pages: 77-96
Series: Synthese
Full citation:
, "Physics and common causes", Synthese 82 (1), 1990, pp. 77-96.