Emergence and reductionism in sociology and neuroscience

David D. Franks

pp. 107-116

in: David D. Franks, Jonathan H. Turner (eds), Handbook of neurosociology, Berlin, Springer, 2013

Abstrakt

This chapter looks at the concepts of emergence and reductionism as different pathways to causal analysis. Paramount herein is Roger Sperry's thesis about mind as an emergent from the synaptic circuitry of the brain and as a causal force that can, in some circumstances, work down to change the material brain's synaptic structures. This is shown to be true only with a great deal of work on the part of the patient and their helpers with OCD, strokes, and recidivism in acute depression. Views of leading figures in sociology and neuroscience are presented. Both emergence and reduction are seen as acceptable ways of conducting science. Five types of reduction are described and evaluated. An exclusive reductionism that reduces human feelings and existence to nothing but synaptic connections is seen as invalid by leading neuroscientists.