Introduction to the special issue "doxastic agency and epistemic responsibility"

Andrea Kruse, Heinrich Wansing

2667-2671

Believing intentionally

Matthias Steup

2673-2694

Negative doxastic voluntarism and the concept of belief

Hans Rott

2695-2720

Against a descriptive vindication of doxastic voluntarism

Nikolaj Nottelmann

2721-2744

Attitudinal control

Conor McHugh

2745-2762

Agency of belief and intention

A. K. Flowerree

2763-2784

On the analogy of free will and free belief

Verena Wagner

2785-2810

Why doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control

Andrea Kruse

2811-2842

Remarks on the logic of imagination

a step towards understanding doxastic control through imagination

Heinrich Wansing

2843-2861

Should have known

Sanford C. Goldberg

2863-2894

Responsible belief and epistemic justification

Rik Peels

2895-2915

A hyperintensional criterion of irrelevance

Stephan Kramer

2917-2930

Wigner's puzzle and the pythagorean heuristic

Jane Mcdonnell

2931-2948

Inscrutability and visual objects

Ben Phillips

2949-2971

Virtuous distinctions

Will Fleisher

2973-3003

Why broad content can't influence behaviour

Cressida Gaukroger

3005-3020

A Russellian account of suspended judgment

Philip Atkins

3021-3046

Time, change and time without change

Ken Warmbrod

3047-3067

Two new objections to explanationism

Bryan C. Appley, Gregory Stoutenburg

3069-3084

Rejecting Pereboom's empirical objection to agent-causation

Jordan Baker

3085-3100