The problem of "directive meaning"

Kazimierz Opałek

pp. 201-215

in: Kazimierz Opałek, Selected papers in legal philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 1999

Abstract

The problem is discussed in ethics (in connection with philosophy and logic sensu largo, including semiotics); and in legal theory. The object of analysis are sometimes "norms", sometimes "rules", "directives' etc. The semantic relations of these terms are not clear and precise: hence the recurrent attempts at defining and correlating them as well as at establishing further terminology for the classification of "norms", "rules", or "directives"¹ For the purposes of this paper a detailed discussion of these questions does not seem necessary. There is, however, another terminological problem which needs explanation. The current use of these terms does not make it clear to what entities they refer: whether to some sort of linguistic formulations; to linguistic expressions as bearers of some meaning, to abstracted meanings alone. But it is easy to see that speaking about "directives", "norms' etc. implies already considerations on a semantic (and/or pragmatic) basis because it is not possible to distinguish them syntactically as some peculiar formulas from the others (though there are some formulas typically adapted to express "norms", "directives' etc.).² The terms "norms", "directives' and the like will be used here synonymously with the terms "directive statements", "normative statements' (or 'statements expressing directives", "norms", etc.) as standing for linguistic expressions together with their meaning. The semantic properties of these expressions will be called "directive meaning" ("normative meaning", and the like).