Conceptual schemes, justification and consistency

Rolf-Peter Horstmann

pp. 263-269

in: Peter Bieri, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Lorenz Krüger (eds), Transcendental arguments and science, Berlin, Springer, 1979

Abstract

The interesting attempt by Prof. Rosenberg to explain a whole series of very important and much discussed epistemological problems through explanatory realism calls for attention and critical examination. It is difficult to resist his plea to accept explanatory realism as a position which, by linking sound elements of a transcendental theory going back to Kant with beliefs rooted in pragmatist traditions, resolves a great number of difficulties for which there had not been very convincing solutions up to now. Another point in Rosenberg's favour is that he does not simply recommend his proposition by presenting the results to be expected from explanatory realism, but at the same time secures its validity by a prognosis on the price which inevitably would have to be paid in case of any alternative position. This price is supposed to consist in having to accept either arbitrariness or ineffability and incognizability which at least for philosophers is a high price to pay indeed.

Cited authors

Kant Immanuel