Some remarks on realism and scientific revolutions

Lorenz Krüger

pp. 227-233

in: Peter Bieri, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Lorenz Krüger (eds), Transcendental arguments and science, Berlin, Springer, 1979

Abstract

Professor Burian's paper displays and explains his tendency to move away from a scientific realism à la Peirce or Sellars and to approach a more or less Quinean stance in the philosophy of science. His view appears to be characterized, among other things, by the combination of the following two claims: (1) Quine's presentation of the problem of radical translation is essentially correct, hence Sellars' or Rosenberg's versions of scientific realism developed from a Peircean metaphysical background are untenable, in particular because these versions assume that the final and ideal conceptual framework of science is uniquely determined. (2) A weaker form of realism of the Quinean type is still good enough as an account of science, i.e. it explains how we can successfully make use of language in finding our way about the world, why our scientific views tend to converge,¹ and in particular why the development of science is free from radical incommensurabilities.

Cited authors

Peirce Charles Sanders

Quine Willard Van Orman