A philosophical-historical analysis of complementarity

pp. 61-88

in: Makoto Katsumori, Niels Bohr's complementarity, Berlin, Springer, 2011

Abstract

In the previous chapter, we have seen a number of prior interpretations of Bohr's complementarity which are widely different from – and some of them diametrically opposed to – each other. To be sure, it is quite common that commentators are divided on any given philosopher's or scientist's ideas. Yet the degree of divergence in the reading of Bohr appears to exceed those in the case of most philosophers as well as many other modern physicists, not least Einstein or Heisenberg. In my view, this lack of consensus largely derives from the nature of the subject matter, Bohr's philosophical thought itself. This is not to say, however – and it would be too facile to conclude – that his thought is simply confused or incoherent. Rather, the following set of questions may be posed: Did Bohr's idea of complementarity not undergo subtle yet significant changes over time, changes that he himself never explicitly acknowledged? Even within one and the same period, is it not structurally too complex to be reduced to a single conceptual framework? Does this complexity in the structural and historical dimensions of his thought not go beyond the conventional interpretive schemes, specifically the opposition of realism and anti-realism?