Incommensurability and empirical comparability

the case of the phlogiston theory

Martin Carrier

pp. 551-564

in: Peter Grdenfors, Peter Gärdenfors, Jan Woleński, Katarzyna Kijania-Placek (eds), In the scope of logic, methodology and philosophy of science II, Berlin, Springer, 2002

Abstract

Incommensurability is among the catchwords of later 20th century philosophy of science. The notion of incommensurability in the non-geometrical sense relevant here was simultaneously introduced by Thomas S. Kuhn and Paul K. Feyerabend in 1962. (Kuhn 1962, p. 103, Feyerabend 1962, p. 58) Kuhn conceived of incommensurability as a contrast between paradigms or comprehensive theoretical traditions that transcends mere incompatibility. The adoption of a new paradigm entails the restructuring, as it were, of the relevant universe of discourse; the adherents of the two paradigms tend to talk past one another. In particular, incommensurability is intended to express that, first, disparate concepts are employed in each of the theories at hand, second, distinct problems are tackled, third, the suggested problem solutions are evaluated according to different standards, and, finally, perceptions are structured differently. (Kuhn 1962, pp. 103–110, 148–150) Feyerabend, by contrast, focused on the "inexplicability," that is, the non-translatability of a term taken from one theory into the conceptual framework of another one incompatible with the first. (Feyerabend 1962, pp. 52–62)