What should Kantians learn from Maimon's skepticism?

Paul Franks

pp. 200-232

in: Gideon Freudenthal (ed), Salomon Maimon: rational dogmatist, empirical skeptic, Berlin, Springer, 2003

Abstract

Near the end of the Versuch, Maimon describes a philosophical position which he ascribes to "the rational dogmatist and the empirical skeptic".¹ When he considers whom he would mention if asked to name someone occupying that position, he says that, for now, he could name only himself.² Maimon's self-description has presented interpreters with a puzzle. Some have found him undecided between two alternatives,³ some have found him more skeptical than dogmatic,⁴ and others have found him more dogmatic than skeptical,⁵ while still others have regarded him as the proponent of a "middle way" between dogmatism and skepticism.⁶ Remarkably few have insisted on the plain implication of Maimon's self-description: that he takes himself to be both dogmatic and skeptical, and that he sees no contradiction in being both because of the way in which he distinguishes the rational from the empirical.⁷

Cited authors

Kant Immanuel

Maimon Salomon