Peirce and Pearson

pragmatism vs. instrumentalism

Peter Skagestad

pp. 263-282

in: Robert S. Cohen, Mark W. Wartofsky (eds), Language, logic and method, Berlin, Springer, 1983

Abstract

In attempting to understand any philosopher, it is at least as important to be clear about what he is denying as what he is affirming. What I shall attempt to do in this paper is throw some light on the nature of the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) by approaching it through an examination of one of the philosophies which Peirce was arguing against, to wit, the instrumentalism of Karl Pearson (1857–1936). My chief conclusions will be of an intellectual-historical nature. I want to show not only that Peirce's pragmatism is distinct from Pearson's instrumentalism (despite striking superficial similarities), but that the two are actually opposed. The scholastic and scientific realism which forms the basis of Peirce's opposition to Pearson is not an anomalous element in Peirce's thought, but is an essential consequence of pragmatism as Peirce intended the doctrine to be understood. Because Peirce was not an altogether consistent thinker, I advance this conclusion with certain reservations, yet on the whole with confidence.

Cited authors

Peirce Charles Sanders