Judgements, propositions, sentences
pp. 80-107
in: , Basic questions on truth, Berlin, Springer, 2000Abstract
It will be shown in this chapter that the equiform expressions "true", which can stand for the properties "true" as variously applied to judgements, sentences and propositions, are analogous to one another, both in the sense of analogy of proportion and in the sense of analogy of attribution. The demonstration will proceed as follows:Firstly, in sections 6.1–6.3 arguments will be brought from the history of philosophy, in each case defending one of theses "judgements are true or false",'sentences are true or false","propositions are true or false".In section 6.4 it will be stated how judgements and sentences are understood, in section 6.5 possible definitions of propositions will be given and critically discussed.In section 6.6 it will be proved that the propositions as defined in section 6.5 can be called true or false on the assumption that sentences and judgements are true or false.The demonstration that sentences are true or false is taken over from Tarski's extensive demonstrations of this facts in mhis essay "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages". From this it also fallows that those kinds of propositions which can be defined by means of sentences (section 6.5) can also be true or false (6.63). It only then remains to show the judgements may also be true or false. This is done as follows: It is first shown that the equiform linguistic expressions "true" and "true" used as signs of the properties "true" of sentences are "true" of judgements are in propositional analogy (section 6.64). Since sentences are true and false it follows that judgements are true or false in sense analogous to this; from this it further follows that those propositions defined by means of judgements (section 6.5) are true or false (6.65).