What are minds for?

John Beloff

pp. 329-342

in: Alexander Batthyány (ed), Logotherapy and existential analysis, Berlin, Springer, 2016

Abstract

Two positions on the mind–body problem are here compared: materialism, which is here taken to mean the thesis that mind plays no part in the determination of behavior so that, for all the good it does us, we might just as well have evolved as insentient automata, and interactionism, which is here taken as its contradictory.It is argued that materialism is more consonant with scientific knowledge and practice, interactionism with common sense and morality, hence, which we favor must depend for the time being on our personal philosophical bias. However, the suggestion is made in conclusion that if the parapsychological evidence were ever to gain general scientific credence the balance of plausibility might tilt decisively in favor of interactionism.