Inchoate situations and extra-rational behavior
pp. 223-243
in: Helmut Staubmann, Victor Lidz (eds), Rationality in the social sciences, Berlin, Springer, 2018Abstrakt
How do individuals act when rational action is not possible? Using Gintis 's 2009 beliefs, preferences, and constraints model, I delineate his three necessary conditions for rational action in the economist's sense of the concept. In order to demonstrate that rational action is not always possible, I provide a range of examples where one or more of Gintis 's conditions are not met. I label these "inchoate" situations. I then consider the wide variety of behaviors that can occur in inchoate situations. I describe these as "extra-rational" behaviors. Importantly, I show that extra-rational behavior can be intentional without being rational. I conclude by arguing that the social sciences need multiple, potentially complementary, models of action. Psychology's recent distinction between System I and System II thinking represents an important move in this direction. The idea of extra-rational behavior strategies for action in inchoate situations potentially provides another additional type of action that is not rational.