Political philosophy of science in nineteenth-century France

from Comte's positivism to Renouvier's conventionalism

Warren Schmaus

pp. 97-111

in: Marcus P. Adams, Zvi Biener, Uljana Feest, Jacqueline A. Sullivan (eds), Eppur si muove, Berlin, Springer, 2017

Abstract

Recent controversy over whether the Vienna Circle can provide a model for today's political turn in the philosophy of science indicates the need to clarify just what is meant by the term political philosophy of science. This paper finds fourteen different meanings of the term, including both descriptive and normative usages, having to do with the roles of political values in the sciences, the political consequences and significance of the sciences and scientific modes of thought, and political processes within the sciences. These different senses are exemplified by the history of nineteenth century French philosophy of science, including Comte and Renouvier, as well as twentieth century logical positivists such as Neurath and more recent philosophers of science such as Kitcher and Longino. The paper also addresses the issue of how there could be a positivist political philosophy of science, given positivisms' questioning of values, and considers Renouvier's social contract approach to a political philosophy of science more promising than either Comte's naturalism or the logical positivists' non-cognitivism.

Cited authors

Comte Auguste