Fear-driven inference

mechanisms of gut overreaction

Paul Thagard

pp. 43-53

in: Lorenzo Magnani (ed), Model-based reasoning in science and technology, Berlin, Springer, 2014

Abstract

Model-based reasoning requires not only inferences about what is happening, but also evaluations of the desirability of what is happening. Emotions are a key part of such assessments, but sometimes they can lead people astray, as in motivated inference when people believe what fits with their desires. In contrast to motivated inference, fear-driven inference generates beliefs that people do not want to be true. Although paradoxical, this kind of inference is common in many domains, including romantic relationships, health, parenting, politics, and economics. This paper proposes that fear-driven inference results from gut overreactions, in which a feeling that something is wrong is erroneously taken as evidence that something really is wrong. We discuss psychological and neural mechanisms by which gut overreactions can lead to fear-driven inference, and show how a computer model of emotional coherence can explain both fear-driven and motivated inference.