Genius in science

Michael Polanyi

pp. 57-71

in: Robert S. Cohen, Mark W. Wartofsky (eds), Methodological and historical essays in the natural and social sciences, Berlin, Springer, 1974

Abstract

We accept the results of science, and we must accept them, without having any strict proof that they are true. Strictly speaking all natural sciences are inexact. They could all conceivably be false, but we accept them as true because we consider doubts that may be raised against them to be unreasonable. Juries base their findings on the distinction between reasonable doubts which they must accept, and unreasonable doubts which they must disregard. They are instructed to make this distinction and to do it without having any set rules to rely upon. For it is precisely because there are no rules for deciding certain factual questions of supreme importance that these questions are assigned to the jury to decide them by their personal judgment. The scientist combines the functions of judge and jury. Having applied to his findings a number of specifiable criteria, he must ultimately decide in the light of his own personal judgment whether the remaining conceivable doubts should be set aside as unreasonable.