Physicalism in Wittgenstein and the Vienna circle

Thomas Uebel

pp. 327-356

in: Kostas Gavroglu, John Stachel, Mark W. Wartofsky (eds), Physics, philosophy, and the scientific community, Berlin, Springer, 1995

Abstract

Various disputes about the invention of physicalism have recently come to the attention of Wittgenstein and Vienna Circle scholars.¹ Despite appearances, these matters are not merely of biographical, extra-theoretical interest but also hold lessons for the historiography of analytic philosophy in the 1930's and "40's. I will try to show that the disputants can be largely disarmed by close attention to their texts. Since there obtained a far wider plurality of doctrines in the Circle than is commonly recognized now — or was recognized even then — the disputes are moot. My resolution of the disputes is offered in tribute to Professor Cohen for three reasons. I will expand and substantiate one of his editorial suggestions in the English translation of the works of one of the disputants, and put to use an earlier remark of his on a striking parallel between Marx and Wittgenstein in support of a thesis congenial to his own work: one of the physicalist doctrines in contention may be viewed as the convergence of two philosophical traditions too often thought mutually exclusive.²

Cited authors

Wittgenstein Ludwig

Marx Karl