Russell on acquaintance with spatial properties

the significance of James

Alexander Klein

pp. 229-263

in: Sandra Lapointe, Christopher Pincock (eds), Innovations in the history of analytical philosophy, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017

Abstract

The standard, foundationalist reading of Our Knowledge of the External World requires Russell to have a view of perceptual acquaintance that he demonstrably does not have. Russell's actual purpose in "constructing" physical bodies out of sense-data is instead to show that psychology and physics are consistent. But how seriously engaged was Russell with actual psychology? I show that OKEW makes some non-trivial assumptions about the character of visual space, and I argue that he drew those assumptions from William James's Principles of Psychology. This point helps us take a fresh look at the complex relationship between the two men. In light of this surprising background of agreement, I highlight ways their more general approaches to perception finally diverged in ways that put the two at epistemological odds.

Cited authors

Russell Bertrand

James William