Pain and unpleasantness
pp. 181-196
in: Stuart Spicker, Tristram Engelhardt (eds), Philosophical dimensions of the neuro-medical sciences, Berlin, Springer, 1976Abstract
What is pain? In one sense of the term "know," we all know what pain is; we can talk about it intelligibly, we can recognize genuine instances of it in others and in ourselves, we can inflict it, almost anyone can relieve simple cases of it, and medical experts can relieve many more kinds. But it is not easy to put this knowledge into words, that is, to say what pain is. We in philosophy are familiar with this puzzling kind of phenomenon; it has always been our daily fare. Consider, for example, what Augustine says about time: For what is time? Who can readily and briefly explain this? Who can even in thought comprehend it, so as to utter a word about it? But what in discourse do we mention more familiarly and knowingly, than time? And, we understand, when we speak of it; we understand also, when we hear it spoken of by another. What then is time? If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not… ([2], p. 253).
