The spurious psyche-soma distinction
pp. 163-177
in: Stuart Spicker, Tristram Engelhardt (eds), Philosophical dimensions of the neuro-medical sciences, Berlin, Springer, 1976Abstract
Philosophers are fond of unveiling arguments which give the illusion of correctness, soundness, and validity, especially when others have already been persuaded by their seeming correctness. Among the informal fallacies noted by logicians is the famous argumentum ad hominem. The abusive form of that fallacy is committed when, we are reminded, instead of trying to disprove the truth of what is asserted, one attacks the man who makes the assertion. In this regard I find myself in an odd if not embarrassing position as commentator on Professor Hans Jonas' paper ([9], pp. 143-61), for it is neither to the point to attempt to disprove the truth of or to reaffirm what he has asserted, since he has admitted that his constructed model, which serves as a tentative solution of the psychophysical problem, "does not even claim to be true," nor does it "portray what is actually the case," since he has only engaged, by recourse to a thought experiment, in "a hypothetical fiction." Furthermore, as student and disciple of Hans Jonas, I could never wittingly condescend to any argumentum ad hominem even were I to think myself clever enough to make such an "argument" palatable to this auspicious audience. The curriculum vitae of Professor Jonas reveals (may I be permitted to say) the excellence of the man and not just his life and thought.
