Sublimity and joy

Kant on the aesthetic constitution of virtue

Melissa McBay Merritt

pp. 447-467

in: The Palgrave Kant handbook, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017

Abstract

Merritt draws attention to the role of the sublime in moral development, or the cultivation of virtue. She focuses on the feelings proper to the appreciation of the sublime, as Kant accounts for this in various contexts: the Critique of the Power of Judgment's Analytic of the Sublime, relevant passages of the Anthropology, and in the discussion of human moral psychology developed across the ethical works. These emotions include: awe (Ehrfurcht), admiration (Bewunderung), and of course respect (Achtung). Merritt argues that these emotions all convey a sense of valuing from a distance, or without a fully agential relation to what is valued. What Kant accepts about the joyous temperament of virtue is that this distance has been closed.

Cited authors

Kant Immanuel