Radical behaviorism and consciousness
pp. 97-106
in: Rolf von Eckartsberg (ed), Metaphors of consciousness, Berlin, Springer, 1981Abstract
Readers interested in a psychology of consciousness might express disbelief at the suggestion that a leading behaviorist, B. F. Skinner, includes in his proper realm of inquiry feelings, thoughts, images, and consciousness. True, he does not consider these to be explanatory concepts, but rather legitimate events worthy of investigation. Those familiar with Skinner's radical behaviorism are well aware that he has provided a means of analyzing the private events or experiences of people in the context of a nondualistic, naturalistic science. However, for many it will be hard to accept the information that radical behaviorists include in their analyses the way people respond to the world within their own skins, and that they can provide the same kind of functional account of an individual's personal, private world as for his public behavior. It is also possible that such a suggestion will be rejected by many as simply bad news. Many cherish the mystery of the world of consciousness and will have no interest in having consciousness demystified and viewed as simply more behavior capable of the same functional analysis as other behavior.