The "color problem"
infinity and the development of Wittgenstein's thinking
pp. 159-184
in: Marcos Silva (ed), Colours in the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 2017Abstract
It is widely recognized the importance of the "color-exclusion problem" for the changes that occurred in Wittgenstein's thought in 1929. Little is known, however, about the relation between the logical analysis of colour statements (task undertaken by Wittgenstein as soon as he start to work in 1929) and the changes that occur in the notion of "generality" in contrast to the Tractarian approach. This paper aims at arguing that there is a close relation between the analysis of statements about chromatic patches in visual space and the abandonment of one of the main characteristic features of Tractarian elementary propositions , namely the fact that they do not leave "room for maneuver" to the world. Indeed, the introduction of "incomplete elementary propositions ", in chapter IX of Philosophical Remarks, argues for the need to introduce propositions which, though elementary, would yet contain, in their senses, a vagueness or indeterminacy. At the time of the Tractatus, this vagueness was symbolized by a general, non-elementary proposition (the scope of this generality was highlighted by a logical prototype). Now, in Philosophical Remarks, the notions of "elementary" and "general" propositions can no longer be opposed, which necessarily leads to a new conception of generality. We will try to show the way that leads to this new theory of generality. Moreover, we hope our analysis can throw some light on the notion of "complete analysis", notion which will undergo substantial changes from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Remarks.
