Conceptual revolutions in science

Stephen Toulmin

pp. 58-74

in: Robert S. Cohen, Mark W. Wartofsky (eds), A portrait of twenty-five years, Berlin, Springer, 1985

Abstract

By now, most analytical philosophers are accustomed to putting their thoughts about morals into a different box from their thoughts about science. By doing this, however, one may conceal the fact that, at the heart of both ethics and the philosophy of science, there lies a common problem — the problem of evaluation. Human conduct can be rated as acceptable or unacceptable, fruitful or misguided, can be approved of or judged inadequate. But so can human ideas, theories, explanations. And this is no simple play on words. In either case — whether moral or intellectual — we can inquire about the standards, criteria or other considerations involved in an evaluative appraisal, and about the bearing of those "considerations' on the actual force and implications of the appraisal. So it is worth asking ourselves, from time to time, whether ethics and philosophy of science might not be more alike than they at present are.