Necessity and contingency in Wittgenstein's thought

Antonia Soulez

pp. 176-184

in: Rudolf Haller, Johannes L. Brandl (eds), Wittgenstein — eine neubewertung/Wittgenstein — towards a re-evaluation, Berlin, Springer, 1990

Abstrakt

Is there a logic of empirical reality? No member of the Vienna Circle would have answered positively to such a question; and Wittgenstein, who of course was apart, less than the others. My point here is, in a way, to show the internal reasons of this impossiblitiy especially in Wittgenstein's thought rather than just accept the commonplace that logical empiricists in a stricter or looser sense defined themselves as opposed to any kind of mysterious link between logic and reality. One can legitimately doubt that these reasons are the same as the ones other Viennese philosophers would have advocated. Yet has the question even a sense in the context of his philosophy? Clearly, Wittgenstein' s rather odd "empiricism" leads one to question the respective status of necessity and possibility before answering the question whether contingency proper can fit into a logical framework or not.

Cited authors

Wittgenstein Ludwig