The phenomenology of epistemic claims

and its bearing on the essence of philosophy

Richard Zaner

pp. 17-34

in: Maurice Natanson (ed), Phenomenology and social reality, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1970

Abstract

Every claim to knowledge is contextual in a double sense. On the one hand, every such claim occurs within a specific situation of action, belief, or inquiry — i.e. within a particular sphere of concern or finite province of meaning¹, or in terms of the prevailing stock of knowledge at hand². As such, no claim can be properly understood or analyzed except in light of the specific context (which may be designated as the "outer" context) within which it occurs. Thus the claim, "This is red," differs in important respects depending upon whether it occurs in the context of an inquiry into color perception, a driving test, a mother's warning to her child concerning objects which burn, a hearing concerning subversive activity, and so on.