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Publication details

Publisher: Springer

Place: Berlin

Year: 1998

Pages: 325-335

Series: Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook

ISBN (Hardback): 9789048149926

Full citation:

Dean P. Foster, H. Peyton Young, "Learning with hazy beliefs", in: Game theory, experience, rationality, Berlin, Springer, 1998

Abstract

Consider a game that is played infinitely often by a set of boundedly rational players. At the beginning of each period, each agent has a belief about the strategies that his opponents will use in that period. These beliefs are derived by observing the play of the game so far, that is, they are conditioned on the information contained in the history of play together with initial conditions such as prior beliefs. We need not assume, however, that the posterior beliefs are derived via Bayes' rule (though they might be). We consider a much more general framework in which beliefs are determined by an arbitrary function that maps initial information and past history to present beliefs (as in Jordan, 1992). We suppose further that players are myopically rational in the sense that they choose a best reply given their beliefs in each period.

Publication details

Publisher: Springer

Place: Berlin

Year: 1998

Pages: 325-335

Series: Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook

ISBN (Hardback): 9789048149926

Full citation:

Dean P. Foster, H. Peyton Young, "Learning with hazy beliefs", in: Game theory, experience, rationality, Berlin, Springer, 1998