Cosmopathy and interpersonal relations
pp. 216-231
in: Smith (ed), Phenomenology in perspective, Berlin, Springer, 1970Abstract
The present reflections arise out of a lingering dissatisfaction with the descriptions of the presence of other people as really others that I find in the phenomenological and existential literature. I have in mind in particular the work of Husserl, Heidegger, and Marcel. Of course, these thinkers have somewhat differing concerns, and I find that my own concerns are closest to those of Marcel which I take to be, "How can one person genuinely be with another?" However, I find myself forced to recognize the prior ontological question, "How are people together at all in the first place?" (Heidegger's question)1 and along with this the prior epistemological question, "How can the existence of the other person be known?" (Husserl's question).2 Answers to the ontological and epistemological questions can be obtained, I believe, by establishing the difference between the presence of things and of people, while at the same time being careful to distinguish both these phenomena from my presence to myself. The central project of this paper will be to make these distinctions.
