On what there isn't
the Meinong—Russell dispute
pp. 159-191
in: , Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski, Berlin, Springer, 1992Abstract
Most commentaries on the Russell—Meinong debate have been content to portray it from Russell's point of view. By following the course of the controversy in some detail, we show it to have been more complex and less one—sided than usually depicted. Both philosophers initially stressed their agreement, but the fundamental differences as to whether there are non-existent objects and whether the usual laws of logic apply without restriction soon became prominent. On these basic positions, neither budged. But in the course of the controversy, they practically swapped positions on the theory of meaning, Russell jettisoning the remnants of a three—tiered theory of meaning for a two—tiered one, Meinong meanwhile interposing a third tier. Russell's influence on Meinong lasted longer and was more positive than conversely, but both benefited from the exchange, and provided paradigms for later theories of meaning and reference. After an evaluation of the outcome of the debate, a brief outline of subsequent developments is given.