Conclusion
pp. 182-183
in: , Encounters between analytic and continental philosophy, Berlin, Springer, 2013Abstract
The history of interpreting encounters between analytic and continental philosophers in the twentieth century has been plagued by a series of omissions, mistakes and misunderstandings, in many cases seemingly small. To a great extent, these have made it easier for the philosophical descendants of the thinkers we have so far discussed (though not necessarily for the thinkers themselves) to talk past each other or simply to follow radically divergent paths which preclude the necessity of exchange. Still, such a conclusion is far too general, and our examination of the particulars of each encounter has demonstrated manners through which the polemical appearance of the exchange at hand is overcome. In all of these encounters, it is not some irreconcilable clash between philosophical movements which is to be found; rather, extra-philosophical factors cause such misinterpretations. Regarding Frege and Husserl, the fierce battle was fought over whether it was Frege who had turned Husserl away from psychologism or not. It was only in the past decade that commentators have placed Carnap and Heidegger within a shared Germanophone context. Despite all appearances to the contrary, its few commentators project the analytic-continental split onto the encounter among Bataille, Merleau-Ponty, and Ayer.