
Publication details
Publisher: Nijhoff
Place: The Hague
Year: 1973
Pages: 105-113
Series: Phaenomenologica
ISBN (Hardback): 9789401023795
Full citation:
, "Being and time", in: Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1973


Being and time
some aspects of the ego's involvement in his mental life
pp. 105-113
in: Frederick Kersten, Richard Zaner (eds), Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1973Abstract
The most obvious cases of ego-involvement in conscious life are those which Husserl calls conscious acts or cogitationes.2 They are the most obvious cases because they are the ones in which the ego explicitly involves himself in some way; they exhibit the character of being engaged in by the ego or having been engaged in by him. This ego-quality or character belongs demonstrably to every conscious process in which the ego engages or lives. In the ego's conscious life, the life to which his, her, or its acts belong, there also occur mental or intentive processes in which the ego does not or did not engage, and these Husserl calls passive or non-actional processes as contrasted with the active or actional processes characterized by ego-engagement.
Cited authors
Publication details
Publisher: Nijhoff
Place: The Hague
Year: 1973
Pages: 105-113
Series: Phaenomenologica
ISBN (Hardback): 9789401023795
Full citation:
, "Being and time", in: Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1973