The retributive attitude and the moral life

Francis Dunlop

pp. 185-202

in: William Hamrick (ed), Phenomenology in practice and theory, Berlin, Springer, 1985

Abstract

In this paper I want to try and show that the retributive attitude is an essential and necessary part of the moral life. If I am right it follows that moral agents are sometimes obliged to express their moral disapproval of the wrongful acts of other people, and to make their indignation "felt" by the wrongdoer. Moral agents are bound, that is, to make the wrongdoings of others their own con­cern, to some extent; it would be morally wrong for everyone to ignore the bad behaviour of others as "none of their business" . In other words again, all members of a moral community ought to be to some extent moral watchdogs, ready to uphold the moral "universe" (as locally interpreted), and to see that others do so as well. Unless this is in general done, I shall try to show, human beings deny an essential part of their nature, community (and society) disintegrates, and the moral life, which is virtually a synonym for "human life", becomes impossible. The retributive attitude is an essential part of human life.