The temporal meaning of transcendence

pp. 146-161

in: Burt C. Hopkins, Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger, Berlin, Springer, 1993

Abstract

Having brought into relief the "matters themselves' of Heidegger's phenomenological account of the origin of Dasein's transcendence toward world in its essential freedom, what now needs to be considered is his account of how "the stepping-beyond entities in transcendence, which is carried out toward all its dimensions, is grounded in the ecstatic composition (Verfassung) of temporality" (MFL, 212/275). Within the context of the discussion of Heidegger's account of the phenomenon of intentionality, the consideration of temporality, as the ground of transcendence, will serve to show precisely how he understands intentionality to have its ultimate phenomenal basis in what he calls the "ecstematic unity of the horizon of temporality"(MFL, 208/269). Heidegger's exhibition of the latter, as the "temporal condition for the possibility of world and of world's essential belonging to transcendence" (MFL, 208/269-70), will then be considered in its function to manifest "that (Daß) and how the intentionality of consciousness is grounded in the ecstatic temporality of Dasein" (BT, 498n. 23/363n. 10).¹ Proceeding in this way, the discussion will bring into bold relief the ultimate phenomenal basis for Heidegger's calling into question, both the priority and originality, of the phenomenon of intentionality. For the purposes of the present study, Heidegger's analysis of temporality in the The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic will form the basis for the discussion of his account of the phenomenon of time, "because here he is concerned with merely showing the implications which temporality has for the issue of intentionality."²