The value of absence

Steven Laycock

pp. 63-80

in: Lester Embree (ed), Phenomenology of values and valuing, Berlin, Springer, 1997

Abstract

Setting aside, though by no means discounting, the lucid, explicitly developed and formalized theory of value of the Nachlass texts, there is a simpler, and in this sense, conceptually more elegant, but not for this reason alone, a deeper, axiology implicit in Husserl's reconstruction of the prethematic interest which sustains our recurrence to identity. Our reflections will orient themselves by reference to the value-theory lying tacit, and awaiting voice, in salient ruminations extracted from Experience and Judgment. But it is not alone for the simple sake of expositing an outlook of unquestionable interest and philosophical penetration that we take up this task. For Husserl's view will form the backdrop of a dramatic departure. Though reticent to appear merely disputatious, I must urge the precise opposite of Husserl's implicit opinion: The primordial value pursued in every conscious act and orienting all conscious interest is, pace Husserl, not presence, but rather absence, the absence even of "absence" inasmuch as absence is itself regarded as a modality of presence. Succeeding years, if not inevitably increasing wisdom, have found me a doctrinal apostate from the Husserlian straight and narrow. I now see in the non-polar, non-processive and atelic "emptiness" (śūnyatā) central to Buddhist thought a fund of values which a Buddhist revisioning of primordial interest alone makes available. It is not, however, in the breach that I would honor Husserl. Replication of his conclusions pays no tribute to the integrity of his spirit. And it is to his spirit, the spirit of the perpetual beginner, the painstaking fidelity to experience, his peerless rectitude and philosophical vigilance, that my own divergence bears allegiance.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund