Natural doubts

Williams's diagnosis of scepticism

Reid Buchanan

pp. 57-80

in: Synthese 131 (1), 2002.

Abstract

Michael Williams believes that scepticism about the externalworld seems compelling only because the considerations that underpin it are thoughtto be ``mere platitudes'' about e.g., the nature and source of human knowledge, and hence,that if it shown through a ``theoretical diagnosis'' that it does not rest upon suchplatitudes, but contentious theoretical considerations that we are no means bound toaccept, we can simply dismiss the absurd sceptical conclusion. Williams argues thatscepticism does presuppose two extremely contentious doctrines, however, he admits thatif these doctrines are themselves motivated by ``platitudes'' then scepticism follows. Iaddress Williams's arguments for thinking scepticism must presuppose these doctrines,and argue that he overlooks a way that they can be seen as motivated by mere platitudes.Thus, I conclude that William's novel rejection of scepticism fails.