Perceptual concepts

in defence of the indexical model

François Récanati

pp. 1841-1855

in: Peter Pagin, Robert van Rooij, Jonas Åkerman (eds), Philosophy of language and mind, Synthese 190 (10), 2013.

Abstract

Francois Recanati presents the basic features of the *indexical model* of mental files, and defends it against several interrelated objections. According to this model, mental files refer to objects in a way that is analogous to that of indexicals in language: a file refers to an object in virtue of a contextual relation between them. For instance, perception and attention provide the basis for demonstrative files. Several objections, some of them from David Papineau, concern the possibility of files to preserve and add information about objects across contexts. How is it possible to think about the same object when the subject no longer is in the original context? How is it possible to think of a perceived object as already known? Can this be done without an explicit identity judgment? Recanati answers these questions by invoking mental files of non-basic kinds and by describing the cognitive dynamics in which they take part.

Cited authors

Papineau David