Lebenswelt und Intentionalität der Urteilsbildung

Zur Revision eines phänomenologischen Grundkonzepts

Jagna Brudzińska

pp. 169-180

in: AUC Interpretationes 7 (2), 2017.

Abstrakt

This paper approaches the notion of lifeworld as the original ground for intentional judgments. Husserl’s phenomenology begins with a purely theoretical understanding of intentionality and judgment, but his position later evolves into a broader account of the practical and genetic, preverbal, and pre-reflective aspects of intentionality. This broadening of the conception of intentionality corresponds with the discovery of the complex, intertwined, and multi-layered dimension of lifeworld. An important step in the development of a more encompassing theory of lifeworld is provided by Husserl’s reflection on Avenarius’ notion of “natural world” already in 1910/11. However, Husserl reaches the full accomplishment of the theory of lifeworld and of the formation of judgment only by designing the phenomenological genetic method, thereby developing a new understanding of transcendental subjectivity and introducing the notion of type as a concrete generality arising from the lifeworld.

Cited authors

Husserl Edmund